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Abstract
This article is focused on some conditions in today’s world of 
globalized media, which are producing either an uncritical ac-
quiescence or fright in Muslim societies as a result of the in-
teraction between these societies and the contemporary West-
ern powers that represent modernity and postmodernity on the 
global stage. The rise of fundamentalism, a tendency toward 
returning to the roots and stringently insisting upon some pure 
and literal interpretation of them, in almost all the religions of 
the world is a manifestation of this fright. The central concern 
of this article is to suggest that fundamentalism is neither the 
only nor the most reasonable response for Muslim societies in 
the face of contemporary modernity. Muslims need to adopt an 
independent and critical attitude toward modernity and reshape 
their societies in the light of the ethics of the Qur’an, keeping in 
view the historical link between Islam and science in as much as 
Islamic culture paved the way for emergence of modern science 
during European Renaissance. The necessity of a pluralistic or 
contextualized modernization of Muslim societies is discussed 
along with the need for the removal of cultural duplicity in the 
role of the West in relation to Muslim societies. All this leads to 
an overall proposal for modernization which is given towards 
the end. 
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Introduction
The issue of relationship between religion and modernity is a complex one. 
There are those who take modernity and religion to be antithetical.2 Such 
is not the perspective that I am taking here. Religion is presumed here to 
be compatible with the basic ingredients of modernity, and now postmo-
dernity—ingredients such as universal (non-discriminatory and difference-
sensitive) ethics, sociopolitical institutions based on such ethics, science 
and technology, and more recently, globalization. William James, Muham-
mad Iqbal, and more recently, Paul Hirst accept religious experience as 
an authentic form of experience and knowledge, which can take its place 
alongside of other forms of experience—experiences that are moral or aes-
thetic.3 In fact, plurality of types of experiences and forms of knowledge 
derived from them is, after Paul Hirst, taken here as an essential feature of 
a genuine and mature phase of contemporary modernity.4  
However, this article is not focused on either epistemological plural-
ism or the nature of modernity5 or religion. It is focused on some condi-
tions in today’s globalized world, which are producing either an uncritical 
acquiescence6 or fright in various traditional societies as a result of their 
interaction with the contemporary Western powers that represent moderni-
ty on the global stage. Under the impact of the forces of modernity, which 
is attended by deep sociopolitical, economic, and moral discontents7 as 
well as hollow pop culture—this fright is, more than anything else, a fear 
of losing identity and authentic values of the tradition. The rise of funda-
mentalism, a tendency toward returning to the roots and stringently in-
sisting upon some pure and literal interpretation of them,8 in almost all 
the religions of the world is a manifestation of this fright.9 In this article, 
my central concern is to suggest that fundamentalism is neither the only 
nor the most reasonable response for Muslim societies in the face of con-
temporary modernity. Muslims need to adopt an independent and critical 
attitude toward modernity and reshape their societies in the light of the 
universal ethics of the Qur’an, as well as the historical link between Islam 
and science, and develop their own culturally contextualized modernity. 
The third element required for modernization (inclusive of democratiza-
tion) of Muslim societies is related to the role of the West in the Muslim 
societies. The West needs to view the future of humanity as interdependent 
and must extricate itself from its standing tradition of double-talk and du-
plicity when it comes to the modernization and democratization of Muslim 
(and other) societies. 
3Modernity and Muslims
In Section 1 below, I address the notions of modernity and postmoder-
nity and globalization. I highlight Harbermas’ understanding of modernity, 
his presentation of the Nietzschean critique carried out by a number of 
thinkers, and his view that contemporary modernity is a “high modernity” 
rather than postmodernity. Then, I briefly discuss the notion of globaliza-
tion in order to bring out some contours of our today’s world as a “global 
village.” In Section 2, I discuss the hegemonic impact of global Western 
media networks on the Muslim societies and the way this phenomenon is 
leading to fright in those societies. In Section 3, I briefly explain the tra-
ditional double-talk of Western powers throughout the twentieth century 
in relation to the modernization and democratization of Muslim societies. 
In Section 4, I offer a very brief glimpse of the universal dimension of the 
Islamic ethic, which can become a basis for modern social and democratic 
political institutions in Muslim societies. In Section 5, I briefly note the 
historical linkages between Islamic culture and the emergence of modern 
science and technology through the European Renaissance (a contribution 
that in fact started in Muslim Spain). And, in the concluding section, I in-
tegrate the ideas discussed earlier into a proposal for the modernization of 
Muslim societies.
The Crucible of Modernity, Post-modernity and 
Globalization: How Should Muslim Societies Respond?
Although, in this paper, I do not focus on either modernity or globaliza-
tion, I nevertheless aim at underscoring the need of Muslim societies to 
engage with modernity in a globalized world, albeit on an intellectually 
equal footing and after critical analysis of the equations of give and take. 
Given these goals in this article, it might be of use to look at the concepts 
of modernity and globalization carefully right at the beginning and point to 
some reasons why Muslim societies cannot avoid engaging these phenom-
ena. The questions I will address in this section, therefore, are: what is the 
nature of modernity and globalization and what are their paradoxes; and 
why do Muslim societies have no choice but to engage these contemporary 
phenomena? In the process, I will also touch on the issue of the emergence 
of postmodernity. 
Let us look into modernity first. There are various perspectives to the 
current debate on modernity and postmodernity. The philosophical per-
spective on this debate centers on some of the positions developed by Jür-
gen Habermas.10 For him, the “project of modernity” is continuous with the 
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humanism of European Enlightenment insofar as human reason is consid-
ered to be the final arbiter in all matters pertaining to individual and social 
life, as well as an understanding of reality in general. Harbermas believes 
that it was Hegel who first articulated what he calls “the project of moder-
nity.” This project is based on a metaphysics and an epistemology which 
has come under attack from people like Nietzsche, Adorno, Foucault, 
Heidegger, Derrida, and their varied followers. This metaphysics and epis-
temology, according to Harbermas, is an epistemology and metaphysics of 
objects. According to Hegel, the tool to uncover the reality of these objects 
both ontologically and epistemologically is reason,. The key thing in this 
outlook is that being (the being of objects) is a manifestation of reason, 
and its knowledge is also possible through a person’s exercise of reason. 
The central notion here, according to Harbermas, is “subjectivity.” Hegel’s 
characterization of this notion in terms of “freedom” and “reflection” im-
plied individualism, autonomy of action, the right to criticize (rationally) 
any and all, and the idealist philosophy as a way of self-understanding. It 
is these elaborations of subjectivity by Hegel, which turned this notion into 
a centerpiece of modernity. Given Descartes’ and Kant’s emphasis on a 
subject-centered epistemology earlier, this characterization by Hegel was 
obviously a continuation of the break with the medieval scholastic past, 
which was launched by Descartes and which culminated in Kant’s cel-
ebration of pure reason. No longer were we to adjudicate in matters of 
knowledge, values, reality—and even religion—except through the office 
of reason. Hegel became the philosopher of modernity by elaborating this 
subject-centered epistemology to the fullest. From now on, in this the new 
historical epoch, modernity was not to look to an earlier age as a source of 
norms. All norms were to be structured by human reason itself, the final 
arbiter and judge in all spheres of life.
Such a project and role for reason, according to Harbermas, implied 
not only subjectivism but also fallibilism, insofar as human reason can go 
wrong. In addition it implied universalism insofar as the norms derived 
from reason were considered universally applicable.
In Harbermas’s own words:
Autonomous public spheres can draw their strength only from the re-
sources of largely rationalized lifeworlds. This holds true especially for 
culture, that is to say, for science’s and philosophy’s potential for inter-
pretations of self and world, for the enlightenment potential of strictly 
universalistic legal and moral representations, and, not last, for the radi-
cal experiential content of aesthetic modernity. It is no accident that so-
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cial movements today take on cultural-revolutionary traits. Nonetheless, 
a structural weakness can be noticed here that is indigenous to all modern 
lifeworlds. Social movements get their thrust-power from threats to well-
defined collective identities. Although such identities always remain tied 
to the particularism of a special form of life, they have to assimilate the 
normative content of modernity—the fallibilism, universalism, and sub-
jectivism that undermine the force and concrete shape of any given par-
ticularity.11 
Harbermas’s point here is that modernity tends to subsume collective cul-
tural identities under universal, fallibilistic, and subjectivist interpretations 
and, in the process, does violence to particularities. According to Harber-
mas, these characteristics make the project of modernity continuous with 
progressive humanist agenda of European Enlightenment.12 The human as 
a rational subject is the unmistakable center of both Enlightenment and 
modernity. However, Harbermas also looks at other historical develop-
ments, like the Reformation and French Revolution, as connected with the 
subject-centered agenda of modernity. As described by social thinkers like 
Weber, Mead, and Durkheim, through these developments, reason progres-
sively manifested itself as the sole arbiter of human affairs, and thereby, 
societies became progressively “rationalized” and “secularized.” Secular-
ization, therefore, is simply a progressive application of reason to the or-
ganization of human societies and is linked with the project of modernity. 
This process was reinforced by Industrial Revolution and the resultant re-
organization of societies under new forms of socialization.
As modernity unfolded itself as a political project through the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, it became associated with liberalism as the 
dominant social and political philosophy—though by nineteenth century, it 
also saw the emergence of Marxism as a political alternative for the mod-
ern age. The association with liberalism was quite natural because liber-
alism is based on some of the same assumptions about subject-centered 
epistemology that informed modernity in general. As John Gray points out, 
individualism, universalism, egalitarianism, and meliorism, are essential 
ingredient of liberalism.13 Individualism takes a person rather than a social 
group to be primary from a moral point of view; universalism is the idea of 
the moral unity of mankind as more primary than cultural or political and 
religious associations; egalitarianism asserts equality of all people in legal 
and political order; and meliorism is the affirmation that human institutions 
can always be corrected and improved. Gray’s characterization of the ele-
ments of liberalism can be easily seen to be linked to the subject-centered 
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approach found in thinkers from Descartes through Hume and Kant to 
Hegel. Despite their systemic differences, all these thinkers emphasized 
that subject-centered reason is at the core of our knowledge of the world. 
This is obviously a kind of individualism in epistemology. However, this 
individualism of rationality does not stop rationality from being universal 
or universalizable. For example, one can see this point from Kant’s moral 
philosophy which is based on universal character of the so-called Categori-
cal Imperative.
What is rational in one case must be rational in all similar cases. So 
universalism is in-built into the subject-centered epistemology of modern-
ists. But epistemic universalism quickly leads to political universalism in-
sofar as it brings all human beings under the same moral principles under 
similar circumstances. Equality before the legal and political order, the 
egalitarian component of liberalism, then follows from moral equality of 
humans. Common moral imperatives imply similarity of legal and political 
status; otherwise, moral discrimination ensues. 
Since subject-centered epistemology is based on the idea that human 
reason, though the sole arbiter and judge in all matters, is nonetheless fal-
lible, all social and political institutions built by humans can therefore fall 
short and can always be improved. Hence, meliorism is also a natural con-
sequence of a subject-centered epistemology. 
The overall point here is that for Harbermas a subject-centered reason 
is an essential part of the agenda of the project of modernity. He believes 
though that this project has come under attack from what he calls the “Ni-
etzscheanism” of people like Adorno, Foucault, Heidegger, Derrida, and 
their followers. In this line of attack, Harbermas sees a “particularist” em-
phasis that aims at challenging the universal goals of the project of moder-
nity. While this is not the place to elaborate the ideas of these thinkers indi-
vidually, it must be noted that all of them share a certain skepticism about 
the subject-centered epistemologies of the project of modernity. For them, 
these epistemologies are what Dewey called “spectator epistemologies,”14 
and what more recently have been characterized as “representational” epis-
temologies by Richard Rorty.15 These epistemologies are not necessarily 
a product of modern thinking. According to Dewey and Rorty, they have 
been with us in different forms from the days of Plato and Aristotle.
A number of charges have been leveled against this type of episte-
mology. Derrida, focusing on texts, claims that through his deconstruc-
tive approach that all texts—including those of systematic theories such 
as Platonism, structuralism, and phenomenology—undermine their own 
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ostensible meaning in many subtle ways. In this way, rational theories fail 
to do justice to their subject matter, and in the process of developing such 
“rational” theories, the theoretician does violence to a number of aspects 
of the subject matter. His ostensible meaning hides an alternative meaning 
that undermines the rationality of his project. In Derrida’s own words, de-
constructive approach aims at bringing this point out:
Each time that I say ‘deconstruction and X (regardless of the concept or 
the theme),’ this is the prelude to a very singular division that turns this 
X into, or rather makes appear in this X, an impossibility that becomes its 
proper and sole possibility, with the result that between the X as possible 
and the ‘same’ X as impossible, there is nothing but a relation of hom-
onymy, a relation for which we have to provide an account. . . .16
With this approach, there can be no one rational interpretation of texts. 
Texts lend themselves to a variety of interpretations, and they always need 
to be deconstructed (analyzed) in order to allow the hidden dimensions 
and differences of things to come into play. From this point of view, the 
subject-centered epistemology, in its zeal to look for the universal, does 
violence to the particular, the contextual, and the different.
Rorty charges that the representational epistemologies, at the heart 
of the modernity project, are suffering from an erroneous view of mind, 
which is understood as the mirror of nature. The idea that the human mind 
mirrors the world outside and this mirroring can be genuine insofar as we 
can compare it with reality outside us (the so-called correspondence theory 
of truth) is simply empty. One can not compare beliefs or propositions with 
the external world. All we are capable of doing is to compare beliefs with 
beliefs, and propositional contents with propositional contents. Any claims 
that we might make about the nature of reality itself are themselves just 
propositional contents or thoughts or part of a conversation,17 and there is 
no Archimedean point from which we can compare our beliefs or thoughts 
with reality per se. 
Nietzsche himself looked at everything, including human self, as an 
interpretation. There was nothing with which these interpretations could be 
compared to check their truth. The point here, however, is not the details 
of this attack on modernity but its general elan. These thinkers despair 
about the possibility of capturing universal truth regarding things in ratio-
nal theories. Theories hide aspects of reality in the very process of mak-
ing certain aspects of reality explicit. The particular and the different can 
escape their net. But as far as life goes—as far as people’s “lifeworlds” go, 
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they are contextual and particular; they are different; they cannot be neces-
sarily strait-jacketed into some universal frames. Hence, these antimodern-
ist thinkers believe the project of modernity to be violent in its spirit to the 
particularist and contextual reality of people’s worldviews and cultures.
Harbermas understands this attack on the modernist epistemology as 
an attack on the epistemology of objects. This epistemology aims at know-
ing things through objectifying them and pushing them into so-called uni-
versal frames of reason. The fault, according to Harbermas, lies with this 
epistemology and not with modernity itself. Harbermas proposes to replace 
this epistemology of objects with an epistemology of reaching mutual un-
derstanding through what he calls “communicative action.” It is an action 
based on mutual recognition. In Harbermas’ opinion, therefore, the mod-
ernist universalist reason needs to be replaced with “communicative rea-
son” rather than despairing of modernity as a whole. For him, we are living 
in a period of “high modernity” rather than post-modernity. Communica-
tive reason recognizes not only the world of objects but also the subjective 
and social worlds. In so doing, it does not do violence to the cultural or 
subjective particularities. However, some of the antimodernists consider 
the project of modernity not only to be pernicious in many respects but 
also to have come to an end. A new period of postmodernity, they argue, 
has already dawned on us. It is this postmodernity which is sensitive to the 
particular, the contextual, the different—and, hence, pluralistic and sensi-
tive to all sorts of cultural differences. 
There are a number of other stories that thinkers and analysts have 
told about modernity and postmodernity.18 The important thing here is to 
keep in view the fact that modernity did split into a bourgeois capitalist and 
anti-bourgeois socialist camps in the nineteenth century. In the process, it 
produced massive industrialization and secularization in Europe as well as 
America, and societies became massively urbanized. It is these societies 
that are the models of modernity in the contemporary world for everyone 
all over the globe—including the Muslim societies, which as part of the 
so-called third world are themselves struggling against a host of problems 
from poverty to political instability or autocratic governance, or both. As 
modernity unfolded itself in the West, Europe moved into an imperial mode 
and started colonizing vast regions of the globe. Colonialism became an-
other manifestation of modernity, and the universalism of subject-centered 
reason was turned into an instrument for exposing the “irrationality’ of the 
native cultures. As I discuss below, Muslims—who had paved the way 
earlier for emergence of modernity in Europe—encountered modernity as 
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a colonized people in vast regions of their native lands. Today, recently 
decolonized Muslim societies still labor under the yoke of neocolonialism 
in our globalized world. Therefore, it is to the issue of globalization that 
we must turn now. 
Globalization like modernity has no fixed definition. One comes across 
a large number of characterizations in the burgeoning literature on the sub-
ject.19 However, a number of characterizations point out interconnectedness 
as central to globalization and then note a number of phenomena associ-
ated with it. It needs to be pointed out though that not all scholars agree that 
the world has already entered a new period of social organization called 
“globalization.” Those who dispute that we have entered a new period in 
human history argue that today’s interconnectedness and interdependence 
is not greater than the period from 1890 to 1914.20 Proponents of globaliza-
tion, on the other hand, point to interconnectedness of economies, cultures, 
information flows, and the flow of populations in the contemporary world 
as some of the factors that have contributed to creating a “global village.” 
In their view the concepts of time and space have also undergone funda-
mental change because of this interconnectedness of the world through 
technologies facilitating flow of information, people, and goods. This in-
tegration of the world, they think, has generated new global forces from 
politics and economy to culture and media. 
As far as politics is concerned, globalization seems to have generated 
apparently contradictory forces. On the one hand, when the nations get 
interconnected and have greater interdependence, they can reinforce each 
other’s progress and can work to strengthen peace and prosperity because 
of the reciprocity of their interests. On the other hand, local self-interests 
can feel threatened by global integration, and as a result, conflicts can 
emerge and intensify. Both these trends are visible in the contemporary 
scene. Emergence of fundamentalism in different religions of the world is a 
noteworthy flight toward the local,21 while the appearance of supranational 
organizations and institutions as well as non-state actors—nongovernmen-
tal organizations working for political goals like protection of human rights 
and environment, for example, are taken as evidence of political integra-
tion. This is not the place to adjudicate between the contrary political pulls 
of globalization, but it needs to be noted that not only fundamentalisms 
of various kinds are a visible fact of contemporary global scene, but the 
opposite integrative trends have brought nation-states under considerable 
pressure. As Schirato and Webb say:
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According to some of the more enduring stories of globalization, the in-
creasing significance of a global economy and communication network 
has gone hand in hand with a decline in the nation-state. The argument 
is that the throng of trans- and multinational corporations, international 
bodies of jurisdiction and management, and the congeries of regional and 
international blocs means that the nation-state has lost its reason-to-be, 
and will necessarily wither away. What will replace it is not particularly 
clear. . . .22
Whether or not the nation-state will wither away is an open question. How-
ever, there is no denying the fact that a lot of the functions of the nation-
state are slowly shifting to other global or regional entities. Therefore, it is 
safe to say that politically we are living in an era of contradictory forces: 
movements toward local identities pitted against integrative trends of a 
global or regional scale. 
Some scholars consider economic integration of the world through 
Internet-based financial transactions as the originating feature of global-
ization. For example, Armand Mattelart says: 
Globalization originated in the sphere of financial transactions, where 
it has shattered the boundaries of national systems. Formerly regulated 
and partitioned, financial markets are now integrated into a totally fluid 
global market through generalized connections in real time. The financial 
sphere has imparted its dynamics to an economy dominated by specula-
tive movements of capital in a context of constant overheating. With the 
expansion of the speculative bubble, the financial function has gained 
autonomy from the so-called real economy and supplanted industrial 
production and investment.23 
Of course, the scale of flow of goods and services as well as interdepen-
dence of markets and industries at a global scale is also in the background 
of these financial transactions. Particularly with the advent of new infor-
mation-age technologies, the economy of the world is definitely a global 
system today in more ways than ever before. Commenting on these tech-
nologies, Schirato and Webb remark: 
The world changed radically over the twentieth century, and more so over 
the past few decades: much of this change is associated with the develop-
ment of new technologies. One outcome of this is the reduction of the 
effects of space and time on everyday life and on trade. Through commu-
nication technologies we talk to one another, view news and documenta-
ries about other parts of the world and other cultures, revisit history, and 
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share in the cultural production of other social groups. Through other 
technologies we can rapidly traverse the globe physically, transmit infor-
mation almost instantaneously, and send goods around the world in hours 
or days, rather than months. The speed of transmission, and the mobility 
of capital, mean that both space and time seem to have been truncated, 
or to have collapsed entirely. Not surprisingly, then, technology is one of 
the most prominent of the many areas used to characterize globalization, 
and the new communication technologies in particular are seen by many 
people as having radically changed the way the world works.24
These technological developments and their concomitant political and eco-
nomic changes at the global level have had their implications in the cultural 
field as well. However, despite the hegemonic role of American culture 
in the current state of globalization, there is growing diversity to what is 
being globalized. As Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington note: “On the 
cultural level, this [the challenge of globalization as continuation of mod-
ernization] has been the great challenge of pluralism: the breakdown of 
taken-for-granted traditions and the opening up of multiple options for be-
liefs, values, and lifestyles.”25 The point is that in the context of dominant 
cultural trends, lifestyles, and beliefs, there is also a greater awareness of 
diversity of traditions in the globalized world. Also—in addition to global 
trade, travel, and immigration—this diversity is almost unavoidable in the 
current state of media networks because of their global reach. It is not just 
the jeans and burgers that have been globalized. One finds African, Asian, 
and Latin American cultural products and foods in most major cities of the 
world, particularly so in the Western cities. Also, it is not just the knowl-
edge produced in the West which is globalized. The traditional knowledge 
of different cultures of the world is also flowing over to all parts of the 
world at a much greater pace in the world of the Internet. Western, particu-
larly American, hegemony is a not to be underestimated in today’s world, 
but the flow of diverse cultures across the globe is also a steady trend. 
Culturally, therefore, we might be said to be living in a hegemonic world 
which is becoming diverse at its edges.
The point of my foregoing remarks on modernity and globalization is 
simply to underscore the fact that, despite many paradoxical trends, we are 
living in a world of “high modernity” or postmodernity which, according 
to a large number of scholars, is a globalized world. The question then is 
how Muslim societies should act in this crucible of modernity and global-
ization Speaking a priori—is it at all possible for a society to either accept 
or reject globalized modernity wholesale, or can it evaluate its values and 
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norms along with those of globalized modernity and develop a synthesis of 
mutually acceptable values? It is hard to imagine that any society can reject 
historical developments like globalized modernity wholesale. But some-
times the critiques of modernity and globalization are interpreted as if soci-
eties can avoid entering into these modes altogether. This, however, seems 
to assume that there are many ways for different cultures of the world to 
grow and go through stages of development. However, recent studies of the 
development of all the known cultures throughout history seem to point to 
the contrary. Comprehensive surveys of these cultures by anthropologist 
show that there are universal patterns to the growth of cultures.26 Given 
this understanding, there is no avoiding modernity for any mainstream cul-
ture of the world, including Muslim cultures. This does not mean that all 
cultures will become Westernized. It just means that industry, technology, 
and social reorganization of societies on democratic lines within the frame-
work of their own cultures are going to penetrate all major societies of the 
world in due course. It is best, therefore, for all societies to bring about the 
necessary adjustments in their practices in a conscious and directed fashion 
rather than imbibe global influences in a haphazard manner. The issue for 
over 1.5 billion Muslims in today’s world is not to find ways to sidestep 
modernity or postmodernity but to adapt it to their cultural conditions and 
faith. They need not accept all aspects of modernity, but as they live in its 
globalized context, they should find ways to enter into mutual evaluation 
and create their own modernity, just as their ancestors contributed to the 
emergence of (early) modernity in Spain. In fact, commenting on Islamic 
movements, Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington seems to underscore that 
these movements are working for the same goal of alternative modernity: 
Islamic movements in Turkey and all over the Muslim world clearly in-
tend an alternative modernity: not rejecting modernity in the style of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan or even the militant factions in the Iranian re-
gime, but rather seeking to construct a modern society that participates 
economically and politically in the global system but is animated by a 
self-consciously Islamic culture. A comparable Islamic movement in In-
donesia— procapitalist, prodemocratic, tolerant of religious pluralism, 
but decisively committed to the Muslim faith—was an important factor 
in the demise of the Suharto regime and the election of its own leader, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, to the presidency.27
I take the notion of alternative modernity to be the notion of a synthesis 
of cultural developments in different regions of the world, where culture 
is understood to be one’s total worldview. Such an approach appears to 
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fit well with the contemporary critique of subject-centered argument dis-
cussed above. A reason sensitive to difference and diversity—what Harber-
mas calls “high modernity” in cultures—is what is needed today, and what 
many others have considered a characteristic of postmodernity. If Muslims 
insist on such an approach to modernity and bring their unique cultural val-
ues and perspective to its evaluation and critical acceptance, then they not 
only retrieve their own heritage in modernity but also join the global trend 
toward a rationality and faith sensitized to plurality and diversity. Like ev-
erybody else, Muslim societies have to coexist with others in this world, 
and that requires understanding and tolerance for difference and diversity. 
I may add here that such a sensitized reason should be able to accom-
modate a variety of interpretations of modernity and its political thematic-
like secularism. Reason in this mode is not meant to be universal to the 
point of being blind to difference. It can accommodate Charles Taylor’s 
communitarian critique of liberalism, as well Tala Asad’s critique of Euro-
pean secularism. The reason is simple. Taylor’s emphasis on community28 
as a counterbalance to liberal overemphasis on individualism is in line with 
Harbermas’s critique of subject-centered reason discussed above. The sub-
jectivity of the individual can be viewed as continuous with the life of the 
community by an intention that is not separated from its social context or 
a process that is something like Harbermas’ communicative reason. Simi-
larly Talal Asad’s view that secularism itself can turn into an oppressive 
force in the hands of the nation-state,29 need not be resisted by a reason that 
recognizes the violence inherent in the failure of full mutual recognition. 
Such a rationality—that is, rationality associated with “high modernity”—
is indeed a basis for both Taylor’s Wittgensteinian and Talal Asad’s reli-
gious criticism of modernity. 
Managed Reality in Our Global Village and 
Its Hegemonic Aspect
Intercultural relations in today’s global village are among the most com-
plex ever at all levels. The scale and intensity of interactions between local 
as well as global cultures is unparalleled in human history because of a 
deep transformation in the concept of distance engendered by the ongoing 
information revolution. The media and Internet have truly turned us all 
into next-door neighbors, though most of the time without providing us 
with workable ethics to conduct ourselves in relation to our “new neigh-
bors.” We interact with this new type of neighbor in impersonal but very 
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complex ways and do so on a continual basis. There is no escape from each 
other. In the process, we influence each other individually and collectively, 
pleasantly and unpleasantly, or positively and negatively, in almost all ar-
eas of life. Our religions, our moralities, our politics, our economies, our 
science, our technologies, our dress codes, our achievements and setbacks, 
our pains and joys, and our virtues and crimes—all influence our new type 
of impersonal neighbors.30 Some of this influence is shaped by our own 
decisions, but a lot of it is controlled by the policies and values of the 
media, which we are opening up to or using to communicate with others. 
This means that we can come to love or hate our new type of neighbors 
because of the decisions made by the management of our global village. If 
the management so desires and deems fit, it can help us look at our neigh-
bor in a friendly light even when our neighbor is not truly friendly to our 
best interests, or it can put them in an unduly unfavorable light. So, in the 
global village, we live in a world of managed reality most of the time. The 
“medium is becoming the message” if we understand this cliche as involv-
ing a deliberate construction of the medium by vested interests. My basic 
thesis in this section, therefore, is that we are living in a world of managed 
reality because of the technological tools that have turned us into neighbors 
in our global village.
Placing this idea of managed reality in the context of contemporary 
philosophical debate, it might be noted that Nelson Goodman has argued 
that, after all, there is no such thing as reality over and above different ver-
sions of reality that we have when we work with versions of reality—that 
is, reality as it is understood by different individuals or groups.31 Of course, 
this kind of relativism about reality is hotly contested by the advocates of 
realism who believe that there is such a thing as a mind-independent reality 
or world out there—and that our task is to try and discover or understand it. 
However, the notion of the managed reality that I want to talk about is not 
meant to address the issues involved in the perennial debate between the 
realist and the nonrealist. Managed reality, as understood here, is simply 
the reality that we come to know after it has been filtered through the tech-
nological, socioeconomic, political, or even religious sieve of the relevant 
power groups. Whether or not there is an independent reality out there is a 
question I do not here concern myself with. Let me elaborate. It is clear that 
the picture of the world that filters through to us daily through our televi-
sion sets is a constructed picture, and it is present throughout the globe. As 
Don Ihde notes:
15Modernity and Muslims
[T]he contemporary context is one of global communications networks. 
The image technologies occur in different ways in almost all the cultural 
contexts of the world. In countries in which television is seen as a tool 
to “leapfrog” from tribal village life into the twenty-first century (India, 
for example), satellites beam programs into central village halls in which 
a single television set is watched by all. In more developed countries 
television plus many other communications technologies are decentral-
ized into homes and offices. . . . How is the evening news or the MTV 
video constituted? In the case of the newsroom, editing is done from the 
spectrum of multi-screens which display, simultaneously, the multiplic-
ity of events going on in the world (these already selected from a vast 
variety of sources). The technician-editor scans the compound screens 
and selects and moves from one to another, forming a discontinuous nar-
rative of news fragments. The result is a “constructed” result, fragmented 
but deliberately designed. Similarly, the video is spliced and constructed 
from shots and takes, remnants from the cinema, united by the narrative 
of the single song being sung over the discontinuities of the images. The 
“reality” is a constructed, edited reality.32
It is obvious that those who supervise editing bring their policies as well 
as sociopolitical, economic, and sometimes religious preferences to the 
process. The selecting and moving of bits from screens cannot be done 
in a culturally or politically neutral way. The media networks construct 
our reality according to their perspectives and preferences, and we receive 
from them a version of the world that they have arranged to appear in 
a certain way. The networks send out the messages that the managers of 
the networks choose to send out, in the images that they choose to put to-
gether. The events in the world, therefore, come to us after they have been 
filtered through the technical sieve of the image technologies—along with 
the cultural and political sieve of the owners, managers, home cultures, and 
conditions of the media. This later cultural and political sieve is embed-
ded in the local power structure and its agenda. In Gramsci’s terminology, 
this sieve is comprised of hegemonic cultural forms, the forms that have 
domination in the context of a certain culture, albeit through consent and 
not coercion, in democratic societies.33 
This managed reality then becomes the main basis for our response to 
our neighbors in the global village. To our neighbor, who might  belong 
to another major cultural tradition and be accustomed to different power 
arrangements, this reality may not always appear to be a correct way of 
representing the truth simply because her or his cultural sieve will arrange 
images differently. Hence, the managed reality may appear to her or him to 
suffer from either some or all of the following defects:
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• marred by ignorance of the culture of the neighbor
• imposing a certain political and economic agenda on the rest of the peo-
ple in the global village, and hence, biased
• deliberately insulting the cultural or religious sensitivities of certain 
neighbors
A whole lot of what goes on in the programs of global communications 
networks today in relation to the Muslim world is viewed in the Muslim 
world as suffering from all the three defects above. The Western represen-
tation of reality, insofar as it lacks the universal elements to connect with 
the Muslims’ representation of reality, appears to be offensive and distorted 
to the Muslim audience. The same would be true for any Muslim version 
in relation to the Western audience if it had similar deficiencies. Therefore, 
generally, there is a huge trust deficit between the Western networks and 
their audience in the Muslim world.34 Part of the reason for a growing 
mistrust has to do with the failure of the networks to show reasonable ob-
jectivity in their accounts of the United State’ recent invasion of Iraq. They 
functioned as instruments for projecting official American announcements, 
which eventually turned out to be based on fabrications and lies.35 Iraq is 
not a small story by any means. Therefore, these lies and fabrications and 
the media’s failure to scrutinize them stand out in the popular mind and 
will continue to do so for some time to come. 
In order to appreciate the complexities and negativity that this man-
aged reality creates, we can look at some recent studies of the portrayal of 
Muslims in the Western media. Let us take up the British media first. In 
a recent study, Elizabeth Poole, in her chapter titled “The Effects of Sep-
tember 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage,” gives us a 
detailed analysis of the way the British newspapers the Guardian and The 
Times have covered Islam and Muslims. The years under study are 1994 to 
1997, 1999, and 2003. Poole reaches the following self-explanatory con-
clusion:
It is clear that there is a continuation in the framework of reporting of 
British Muslims since 1994. The newsworthiness of Islam is consistent 
with previous frameworks of understanding and demonstrates how sto-
ries will only be selected if they fit with an idea of who Muslims are. 
Not only is there a consensus of news values but newspapers provide 
a particular interpretative framework for defining events. Unfortunately 
this means a continuation in the themes associated with the topics cover-
age. These being: 
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1. That Muslims are a threat to security in the UK due to their involvement 
in deviant activities.
2. That Muslims are a threat to British ‘mainstream’ values and thus pro-
voke integrative concerns. 
3. That there are inherent cultural differences between Muslims and the 
host community which create tensions in interpersonal relations. 
4. Muslims are increasingly making their presence felt in the public sphere 
(demonstrated through the topics of politics, education and discrimina-
tion). 
The continuation of this framework represents the unresolved anxieties 
around these topics and the continuing struggle of all groups to establish 
hegemony. Whilst the variety of coverage of British Muslims has to some 
extent been maintained — and there have been positive developments in 
the Guardian, with its attention to the increased discrimination Muslims 
experience due to September 11—this oppositional interpretation has 
been marginalized by the dominance of the conservative interpretative 
framework. The huge shift to focus on terrorism now unifies coverage 
within the orientalist global construction of Islam. One image dominates, 
that of ‘Islamic terrorism’. It would appear then that whilst Western/US 
driven policy is now under question for various reasons, these powerful 
groups have been successful in maintaining a hegemony of ideas of Is-
lam, sustaining ‘the myth of confrontation’. For example, policy in Iraq 
has been under fire from various social/political groups and yet media 
coverage continues to offer us images of an anti-modern, political un-
stable, undemocratic, often barbaric, chaotic existence consistent with 
the now widely established foreign new framework. The representations 
of Muslims in the UK are now closer to the undifferentiated global ag-
gressor that theory postulates. The more persistent the framework, the 
more indicative it is of an essential Muslimness and is in danger of be-
coming fixed. These events then define for the public what it means to be 
a Muslim, and then Muslims worldwide can be managed through social 
and aggressive policies.36
I have quoted the conclusion of Poole’s study in full in order for us to ap-
preciate fully the kind of damage that is being done to the quality of neigh-
borly relations in our global village by this managed presentation of reality. 
Essentializing Islam and Muslims has become almost a pattern with West-
ern media.37 This can hardly help to win hearts and minds among Muslim 
audience of this media and only adds to their mistrust of the West.
Let us turn now to two publications from the American media as they 
covered Islam prior to 2001. In a comprehensive content analysis of ar-
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ticles carried by Newsweek and Time magazines on twelve Muslim coun-
tries from 1991 to 2001, researchers Shahzad Ali and Khalid conclude the 
following in their recent article:  
This article has presented a content analysis of 218 articles of twelve 
Muslim countries which appeared in two leading US news magazines; 
Newsweek and Time during period {1991–2001}. These twelve Muslim 
countries were placed in three categories; United States allies (Egypt, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabic and Turkey). United States enemies (Afghanistan, 
Iran, Iraq and Libya) and neutral countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia and Pakistan [sic]. The result of the study indicates that 1943 ar-
ticles about 35 Muslim countries and Islam were published in 1098 is-
sues of the both magazines during the specified period of eleven year, 
(1991–2001). It was also found that cumulative coverage of all twelve 
Muslim countries in both the magazines was comprised of 899 articles. 
Out of these 899 articles about twelve Muslim countries, the content 
analysis of 219 articles were undertaken. Overall it was found that pro-
portion of negative coverage (3553 sentences, 30.77%) was greater as 
compared to proportion of positive coverage (1460 sentences, 12.64%). 
The both magazine, on the whole, carried 11546 sentences about twelve 
Muslim countries. Moreover, . . . [t]he first hypothesis stated that the 
proportion of negative coverage of all twelve Muslim countries will be 
greater than the proportion of positive coverage. This hypothesis was 
accepted. The data indicated that all twelve Muslim countries received 
30.77% (3553) negative coverage while the ratio of positive coverage 
was 12.64% (1460) sentences.38 
The coverage of Islam in the Western media on both sides of Atlantic, there-
fore, is managed through certain generalizations that place Muslims in a 
negative light in the global village. Hence, the managed reality in today’s 
global village is playing a huge but negative role in attempting to bring the 
neighbors together. It is actually pushing them away from each other by 
continuing in its failure to bridge the trust gap. This hegemonic role of the 
Western media networks39 is resented by many in the global village, and 
such resentment is by no means confined to the Muslim world.40 Recent 
surveys have shown that anti-Americanism, for example, is on the rise al-
most globally. Obviously, the information revolution and its technologies 
are neither value-neutral nor free from cultural clash in their impact. 
This hegemonic role of the Western media has various aspects to it ob-
viously. It is hegemonic over other media of the world; it naturally has he-
gemony over the way Westerners think; and it sets itself up in a hegemonic 
role over the way Muslims (and other peoples) think by trying to manage 
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reality for them. The first and the third aspect reflect the overall hegemony 
that the Western powers have exercised in relation to the Muslim societies 
or other societies of the world in general. And such hegemonic agenda is 
still unfolding in the perception of many throughout the world.41 Therefore, 
many societies, including some traditional or conservative religious groups 
within the West, look at the modernization process with great suspicion 
and feel threatened by it insofar as it seems to be tied up with the neo-
colonial agenda of Western powers and capitalism, or what is sometimes 
perceived as decadent secular values. What is unfortunate for many non-
Western cultures of the world is the persistent perception that moderniza-
tion was colonialism yesterday and is neocolonialism today. In the global 
village of managed reality, this perception is being accentuated by the all-
powerful Western media networks, which can be hardly challenged by the 
local media, and hence, appear to be the neocolonial instruments of control 
over non-Western cultures. The result is the ongoing reaction and fright in 
all the societies where people are returning to what they perceive as their 
roots, and fundamentalism is on the rise.42
My focus in the previous paragraphs has been on the media, but glo-
balization is obviously not confined to this area alone. Management of the 
global village is driven by the Western hegemonic agenda at many differ-
ent levels. The prevalent economic world order is heavily tilted in favor 
of the West and is contributing in a huge way to the increasing inequality 
between the haves and have-nots of the world. The Muslim world is also an 
unfortunate victim of this exploitative order. Willy Brandt’s Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues argued in its 1980 report 
that in order for us to survive “immense risks threatening mankind,” we 
need to take urgent measures to address the problems of growing income 
disparity between the North and South, and increasing poverty as well as 
financial and economic instability around the world.43 More recently, No-
bel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz has also argued for an urgent correc-
tion in the ways in which globalization is being handled to further enrich 
the rich. In a poignant remark, he says that the two-dollar-a-day subsidy 
that a cow in Europe receives is more than what half of the world popula-
tion is forced to subsist on.44 
As a result of this grave disparity between the developing and the de-
veloped world, as well as the internal systemic weakness of the develop-
ing countries of the Muslim world, the scientific and technological gap 
between the two sides also keeps growing. Production of scientific knowl-
edge and technology at the local level requires long term and sustained 
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political as well as educational investment. The Muslim countries have 
come out of the clutches of colonialism only recently and still lack the right 
environment for such investments.45 This absence of the right environment 
is both a cause and an effect of lack of appropriate levels of modernization 
in these societies. 
So the economic, scientific, technological, and information gap be-
tween Muslim societies and the West is tremendous and growing. Hence, 
in the global village of managed reality, the overpowering and hegemonic 
position of the West naturally produces the reactions of fright and acquies-
cence noted above. The only real way out of this dilemma for developing 
countries of the Muslim world (and other countries) seems to be the acqui-
sition of the ability to make free and independent choices and decisions as 
cultures and societies. Such an ability basically requires the acquisition of 
modern scientific and sociological knowledge as well as technology. It is 
exactly in the sense of acquiring this knowledge and building their own 
culturally contextualized institutions around it that Muslim societies need 
to modernize. They cannot and should not turn into copies of the Western 
cultures because they will lose their identities in the process.
That is obviously not in the interest of a pluralistic world order—so 
critically important from the point of view of what Harbermas calls “com-
municative reason,” a reason sensitive to differences of cultures and values. 
But, as just noted, such acquisition of knowledge is a long-term process. 
Meanwhile the hegemonic pressure of the developed world continues. 
It must be added that without appropriate levels of scientific and tech-
nological knowledge, the Muslim (and other non-Western) societies cannot 
produce their competing versions of managed reality. The images bom-
barded on the citizens of developing nations are mostly either Western or 
local. But the local media simply lacks the capacity for a global reach. This 
means that our global village has to live with just one version of managed 
reality, and this version produces either fright or acquiescence in its recipi-
ents in the Muslim world—as well as the rest of the developing world and 
conservative sections of the West itself.
Double-talk of Western Powers Regarding the 
Modernization and Democratization of Muslim Societies  
Historically, the Western powers have not remained consistent in their de-
sire for the Muslim societies to modernize and democratize. In fact, de-
pending on the colonial or neocolonial need of the moment, the Western 
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powers have either supported the forces of reaction or modernity in the 
Muslim world. One can notice this simply by casting a cursory look at the 
short-term approach adopted by the Western powers in relation to such 
modernist leaders of the Muslim world as King Amanullah of Afghani-
stan, Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran, Jamal Abdul-Nasir of Egypt, and 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan. Britain and United States are known to 
have used different tactics—including mobilization through bribes and 
other means, and in some cases, inciting conservative clerics to launch 
reactionary movements against modernization and democratization efforts. 
King Amanullah’s program of modernization in Afghanistan in the early 
part of twentieth century was derailed by forces of tribalism and conser-
vatism not without foreign involvement through the so-called Great Game 
being played in Central Asia by Britain and Russia, in which Russia was 
also perceived by the Muslim world as part of the West. There is no ques-
tion that had Amanullah succeeded in his reform and modernization ef-
fort in the period from 1919 to 1928, the history of Afghanistan and the 
entire region would have been radically different.46 This was an historic 
opportunity for the Afghan society to move into modern world by means 
of Amanullah’s comprehensive reforms. But the short-term (and short-
sighted) colonial goals of Western powers dictated policies that led to the 
derailment of modernization in that unfortunate society. Even today, we are 
in the grip of the consequences of that failure at modernization. 
Another glaring case in point is the way democracy was derailed in 
1953 by the United States in Iran by removing Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadegh from power through a CIA-led conspiracy.47 This case is an eye 
opener in the sense that it led directly to the establishment of one of the 
worst oppressive regimes in the region under the Shah of Iran and ultimate-
ly, after twenty-five years, to the Iranian revolution of 1979 spearheaded 
by clergy. Mohammad Mossadegh was a popularly elected prime minister, 
Time Magazine’s man of the year in 1951, who was overthrown by the joint 
efforts of Britain and United States for short-term economic considerations 
regarding oil. Democracy didn’t matter then. To get a sense of how CIA’s 
lead man Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, 
conducted this operation in Tehran, let me quote from Stephen Kinzer’s 
excellent book on the subject:
Roosevelt spent his first two weeks in Tehran conducting business from 
a villa rented by one of his American agents. Decades of British intrigue 
in Iran, coupled with more recent work by the CIA, gave him excel-
lent assets on the ground. Among them a handful of experienced and 
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 28:122
highly resourceful Iranian operatives who had spent years assembling a 
clandestine network of sympathetic politicians, military officers, clergy-
men, newspaper editors, and street gang leaders. The CIA was paying 
these operatives tens of thousands of dollars per month, and they earned 
every cent. During the spring and summer of 1953, not a day passed 
without at least one CIA subsidized mullah, news commentator, or politi-
cian denouncing Prime Minister Mossadegh. The prime minister, who 
had great respect for the sanctity of free press, refused to suppress this 
campaign.48
The US involvement in the matter has finally been officially acknowledged 
by Secretary Albright in a speech in 2000.49 
One hardly needs underline that had Mossedegh’s democracy been 
strengthened in Iran in mid 20th century, the region would have presented a 
totally different look in today’s world. Amanullah and Mossedegh’s cases 
are not exceptions. In fact case after case, the Western powers have tended 
to engage in double talk regarding modernization and democracy in the 
Muslim countries. They claim to stand for modernity and human rights but 
actually follow their governing colonial or neo-colonial agenda of the mo-
ment in a very short-sighted manner.50 
This double-talk of the West continues even today. The story of Af-
ghanistan is a classical lesson in the way Western imperial powers in pur-
suit of their conflicting agendas have and can destroy a nation. The then 
Soviet Union and the United States fought out their war in 1980s on the 
Afghan soil and used local politicians and warlords in the name of either 
totalitarian socialism or jihad, as the case may be, to destroy completely 
the fabric of that society. The country has been completely devastated by 
now at all levels—including its environment, agriculture, towns, villages 
and cultural resources.51 In addition, it is this conflict between two West-
ern powers which directly produced men, materials, and environment for 
Jihadist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and, subse-
quently, on other Western powers as well as Muslim countries. The fact 
that Jihadists have nothing but destruction to offer to Muslim societies and 
to the world at large should be taken as the single most important dimen-
sion of the outcome of imperialist tussles on Muslim lands.52 The moral 
bankruptcy of Western powers’ double talk can ultimately combine with 
other factors to produce only such a destructive outcome. This fact is also 
tellingly exemplified, probably more so than anything else, by the story of 
Palestinian people. Not even the worst repression of the Palestinian people 
seems to have moved Western powers out of their moral stupor and dis-
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sembling talk in this matter—and of course, this has produced terrifying 
consequences for the entire world. 
Overall, therefore, Muslim (and other developing) societies have not 
been treated with any degree of consistency by the West as far as the issue 
of democratization and modernization is concerned. In our global village, 
such treatment of neighbors can produce direct results in our own homes. 
Somehow, we need to break the hold of ethnocentricity on our minds and 
rise to a humanistic level of universal ethics in order to produce uniform 
standards for the treatment of all our neighbors. Double talk has to go as 
a first step toward the integration of humanity under modern and pluralist 
civic and political standards and values. Those who hold the reins of power 
in the West must bring their policies in line with their claimed ethical para-
digm of standing for modernity (read high modernity) and human rights. 
This ethical shift in the policies of Western powers is an absolute require-
ment for the modernization of non-Western societies. Without fulfillment 
of this precondition, the perception in the Muslim and the rest of the non-
Western world that the West’s real interest is neocolonial, particularly the 
control over oil and resources—and it is only paying lip service to the 
cause of modernization in the Muslim and other societies, will persist and 
ensure the inequalities that presently exist between the West and the rest 
of the world.
Universal Islamic Ethics and Modernity
Muslim societies also need to realize that acquiescence and a fear-driven 
flight toward fundamentalism are not the right kind of response to moder-
nity. Modernity with its social, political, and epistemic values is one of 
the biggest developments of human history and is ultimately based in and 
derived from all the major cultures of the world in one way or the other. It 
is not an isolated phenomenon that emerged only in the West. It could not 
have emerged at all without the base provided to it by the medieval Mus-
lim society and earlier cultures in both East and West. This is not the place 
to get into details of what Muslims contributed toward the emergence of 
modernity, or what India, China, Greeks, Romans, and many other societ-
ies did. The general point that needs to be emphasized is that some of the 
great values of modernity are a collective achievement of humanity. Its 
universal orientation in ethics, which is the foundation for modern political 
institutions and human rights, is present in Confucian, Indian, and Islamic 
cultures, as well as other cultures. In addition, there is quite a bit of cred-
ible analyses of archaeological and anthropological data, which has shown 
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that there are universal patterns to the development of cultures throughout 
human history. Cultures move through various levels of development and 
sophistication in a cumulative fashion. There is no evidence that only one 
culture can spearhead all levels of development. Different levels have been 
initially achieved by different cultures, and then other cultures have moved 
to those levels in a systematic and cumulative pattern.53 
Therefore, there is some reason to believe that all cultures of the world 
would sooner or later realize their own forms of modernization. I say “their 
own forms of modernization” to emphasize the fact that different cultures 
remain different even after passing through the same level or stage of de-
velopment. They do not become the same as another culture simply by 
reaching equivalent stages in social formations and development. 
What needs emphasis here is that Muslims have to rise to a better level 
of interaction with modernity than reacting to it by either feeling threat-
ened by it or simply succumbing to its pressure. They need to adopt what 
Pakistani philosopher Muhammad Iqbal calls an “independent and criti-
cal attitude” toward modernity and its intellectual, political, social, and 
technological heritage.54 The point is not that of rejecting modernity out of 
hand by identifying it with secular depravity, as the fundamentalists do,55 
or to become parochial in an evaluation of modernity by using nonuniver-
sal standards of judgment. The point seems to be that Muslims, as well as 
all other societies, will have to adopt vigorous but universal (read nondis-
criminatory) standards in evaluating modernity. I am reiterating here the 
statement I made in the previous section regarding the necessity of a pro-
found ethical paradigm shift in Muslims’ attitude toward modernity and all 
other societies.56 All societies have to be accepted on an equal footing with 
each other and with Muslim societies. Islamic ethics, in fact, are exactly 
the same as universal-humanist ethics—and all parochial interpretations 
of it in terms of both law and morality are based on narrow views of the 
Qur’an and the life of the prophet of Islam.
That the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet have a universal nondis-
criminatory ethical message is hardly denied by any Muslim. However, 
over the centuries, various legal injunctions derived from the universal eth-
ics of the Qur’an have been allowed to be less than universal because of 
the social, political, or even administrative and defense exigencies of the 
times.57 Some orthodox laws about women, non-Muslim minorities, and 
apostates are cases in point. These laws appear to be based on a parochial 
approach to a modern sensibility. In fact, there is no ethical bases in Islam 
for these exigencies. These laws are based on the social, political, and ad-
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ministrative, as well as defense, needs of the medieval Muslim societies. 
Muslims are expected to live by ijtihad and ijmah—that is, creative and 
critical thinking and the consensus of the community, as far as their policies 
and laws go.58 That means that new generations must continuously review 
the laws and interpret the Qur’an and life of the Prophet afresh when nec-
essary. This is because the Qur’an stands for universal ethical standards, 
including justice, and allows for no discrimination against any human be-
ing whosoever. Due to various historical interpretations and cultural prac-
tices prevalent in Muslim societies, the universal ethics or humanism of the 
Qur’an are sometimes lost sight of by Muslims as well outside observers. 
Also, there has been no living Islamic law for many centuries in most of 
today’s Muslim societies59. That means that there has been no evolution 
in the law through a legislative or interpretative process or through both.60 
This has caused the erroneous belief among many Muslims that Islamic 
law or Shar‘iah is a finished product given to us once and for all from a 
remote past and that the responsibility of the Muslims in today’s world is 
to find ways to implement that given law. This belief is dangerous and er-
roneous. It is dangerous because it has led contemporary fundamentalists 
to make claims that they want to implement Shar‘iah in their respective 
societies—meaning thereby that laws developed by early generations of 
Muslim jurists are a given and meant for all times and there is nothing 
more to be done by new generations of Muslims. Such a position effective-
ly locks Muslims in their early history and militates against the dynamic 
spirit of Islam. It is erroneous because all law, as matter of course, requires 
interpretation in new times and climes and as the requirements of times 
change, newer interpretations have to be introduced in the best interests of 
the universal ethical ideals of humanity enshrined in the great religious and 
non-religious documents of the world.
The most fundamental assumption of Islamic ethics happens to be the 
idea that all human beings have been bestowed with an ability to distin-
guish right from wrong and chose between them. This is what the Qur’an 
calls “the Trust”:
We did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Moun-
tains; but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man un-
dertook it. He was indeed unjust and foolish. (33:72)
The seat of this Trust61 is human heart or fu’ād (plural al-af-i-dā). The 
Qur’an says:
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It is He Who brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers when 
ye knew nothing; and He gave you hearing and sight and intelligence and 
affections [al-af-i-dā]: that ye may give thanks (to Allah). (16:78)
From this seat of intelligence and affections come our approval or disap-
proval62 of right or wrong. And for the Qur’an, there is no other criterion of 
moral judgment for God except righteousness: 
O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, 
and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know [recognize] each 
other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honored of 
you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Al-
lah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things). (49:13)
This is the universal foundation of Islamic ethics. Nothing except righ-
teousness (or its absence) can count at the primary level in ethical evalu-
ation. Muslim societies will have to bring these universal foundations of 
Islamic ethics into the focus of their sociopolitical attitudes and institutions 
as well as the legal provisions in treatment of all human beings. These 
ethics can provide a powerful basis for restructuring Muslim societies and 
their institutions on modern lines. Without these ethics of Islam being in 
sharp and central focus, modernization cannot take hold in Muslim so-
cieties regardless of whether it is brought from without or initiated from 
within. Muslim societies need the deep realization that it is their own eth-
ics that call for modernization—on a nondiscriminatory and democratic 
basis—of their institutions and attitudes. The ethics required by modernity 
are already present in Islam. 
That historically this ethics did not always reflect in all the political 
and social institutions of Muslim societies is in large part due to histori-
cal circumstances of these societies. For the better part of Islamic history, 
Muslim societies have been ruled by kings and dynasties whose political-
vested interest did not match the requirements of Islamic ethics. They were 
always more interested in perpetuating their own or their dynasty’s rule 
than in establishing equal political and civil rights for the masses based 
on Islamic ethics.63 A lot of jurists who served these dynasties were also 
motivated by the perpetuation of the status quo rather than rule through 
the consent of the people.64 There is no wonder, therefore, that universal 
Islamic ethics never got properly channeled into political and social institu-
tions in Muslim societies. Had its political and social implications been un-
derstood properly and made the basis for governance in the Muslim world, 
things would have been totally different today. The contradiction between 
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Islamic ethics and dynastic rule, for example, is so blatant and clear that 
one wonders how dynastic rule and kingship ever got institutionalized in 
the medieval Muslim societies to begin with. 
Historically the dynastic rule that persisted for centuries in blatant vio-
lation of the ethics of Islam was replaced in most of the Muslim societies 
by the worst form of governance known to humanity—that is, colonial 
rule. Here, we have a situation where Muslim masses were systematically 
subjected to exploitation and humiliation for no reason at all except that 
their dynastic rulers were too weak (and depraved) to stand up and defend 
their lands. The colonial powers, as Edward Said argues65 for example, 
were interested in exploitation and psychic destruction of the people in the 
Muslim lands rather than contributing to their societies and institutions. 
A lot of the times, Muslims were portrayed as ignorant fanatics face to 
face with the civilized world. (Churchill in his day, for example, frequently 
refers to Muslim tribes as “savages” and “fanatics.”66) Under these histori-
cal circumstances, it is obvious that the masses in the Muslim world have 
never been allowed a genuine opportunity to construct their sociopolitical 
institutions on the basis of their own ethics. Therefore, Muslim societies 
need not take the dynastic or colonial past as reflecting their true ethics 
and can move forward to capture the universal ethical spirit of the Qur’an 
and create fresh democratic political institutions that are truly reflective of 
equal rights for all. Such institutions are naturally going to be Muslims’ 
way of participation in modernity, without becoming Westernized.
Islam and Science and Technology
There are at least four levels at which science and technology relate to 
Islamic societies. First, there is a deep and underappreciated historical link 
between Islam and modern science and technology. Second, even in the 
popular perception in the Muslim world, science and technology are not 
viewed as antithetical to religion. Third, scientific study of nature is di-
rectly encouraged by the Qur’an as a way of understanding God’s signs in 
nature. Fourth, Muslim societies should not accept only an instrumentalist 
view of technology, but instead, they should continually adjust and review 
their attitude to the relationship of science and religion.
First, a few words about the historical link. There is at least one school 
of science historians and thinkers who strongly believe that modern sci-
ence owes its emergence in the West primarily to the influence of Islam. 
Robert Briffault, 67 George Sarton, Montgomery Watt, and John Hayes, 
among others, believe that without the contributions of Muslims and Arabs 
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to mathematical, methodological, and practical levels, the emergence of 
modern science in the West would have been impossible. Such historians 
argue forcefully and with extensive evidence that the Renaissance was a 
direct result of Arabic influence in Cordova, a place where many Arabic 
books were obtained for translation into Latin by Europeans and where a 
lot of European scientists received their training as students. The universi-
ties that were established in Europe were based on Arabic learning and 
used books that were obtained in Cordova and translated from Arabic into 
Latin. Jews that came from Cordova with William of Normandy to Eng-
land established a school of science at Oxford and taught Arabic science 
there. It was under their successors that Roger Bacon later studied both 
Arabic and Arabic science. In Robert Briffault’s own words: “It was under 
the influence of the Arabian and Moorish revival of culture, and not in the 
fifteenth century, that the real renaissance took place. Spain, not Italy, was 
the cradle of European rebirth.”68
However, this fact has been systematically minimized by Western his-
torians from the earliest days to our times. Briffault notes this point with 
characteristic force:
The fact has been set forth again and again. But it has been nevertheless 
stubbornly ignored and persistently minimized. The debt of Europe to the 
‘heathen dog’ could, of course, find no place in the scheme of Christian 
history, and the garbled falsification has imposed itself on all subsequent 
conceptions. Even Gibbon treated Islam depreciatingly, an instance of 
the power of conventional tradition upon its keenest opponents.69 
Lest someone think that Briffault is too outdated a source to quote in sup-
port of my claims, let me point out that many very recent studies by a group 
of scholars have successfully established that the most important develop-
ment in Renaissance science—that is, the Copernican Revolution—was a 
direct product of astronomy and science as it was developed in the Muslim 
world. George Saliba, a leading member of this group of scholars says:
Between the years 1957 and 1984, Otto Neugebauer, Edward Kennedy, 
Willy Hartner, Noel Swerdlow, and the present author, as well as others, 
have managed to determine that the mathematical edifice of Copernican 
astronomy could not have been built, as it was finally built, by just us-
ing the mathematical information available in such classical Greek math-
ematical and astronomical works as Euclid’s Elements and Ptolemy’s 
Almagest. What was needed, and was in fact deployed by Copernicus 
(1473–1543) himself, was the addition of two new mathematical theo-
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rems. Both of those theorems were first produced some three centuries 
before Copernicus and were used by astronomers working in the Islam-
ic world for the express purpose to reform Greek astronomy. In other 
words, the research that has accumulated over the last forty odd years has 
now established that the mathematical basis of Copernican astronomy 
was mainly inherited from the Greek sources—mostly from Euclid and 
Ptolemy—except for two important theorems that were added later on 
by astronomers working within the Islamic world and writing mainly in 
Arabic. Furthermore, the same recent findings have now demonstrated 
the context within which these theorems first appeared in the Arabic as-
tronomical sources, namely, the context of criticizing and reformulating 
the Greek astronomical tradition. We also know that the works contain-
ing such theorems were mostly produced during the thirteenth century 
and thereafter. Accounts of such works have been detailed in various 
publications.70
The theorems that Saliba is talking about are Urdi’s Lemma and Tusi Cou-
ple.71 These theorems and the work of Ibn al-Shatir were absolute essen-
tials for reforming the Greek astronomy, and there would have been no 
such thing as the Copernican Revolution without them. That is why Saliba 
calls Copernicus “the last Maragha astronomer,” referring to the famous 
Maragha observatory established by Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in 1259 in Iran. 
Now it is hardly possible to underestimate the significance of Coper-
nican Revolution for modern science. If the foundations of this revolution 
were laid by Muslim scientists, then modern science in many ways is a by-
product of Islamic culture as well. Scholars listed in the above quote from 
Saliba and many others are systematically engaged in the task of delineat-
ing the history of science in Islam and its influence on the modern science. 
For our purposes here, it is enough to conclude from this recent work in the 
field that Briffault is not outdated in his claim that Renaissance (emergence 
of modern science) owes its very existence to the world of Islam. 
A lack of appreciation of the historical link between Islam and modern 
science in the West is also fully paralleled by today’s Muslim societies. 
Both the traditional religious seminaries (madrassahs) and modern univer-
sities in the world of Islam are more or less devoid of any systematic cours-
es of study in history of science and technology, which emphasize Islam’s 
role in the emergence of modern science and technology.72 As a result, 
neither the modern educated nor the traditionalists have a good grasp of 
the fact that one major component of modernity—that is, modern science 
and technology have their roots in their own classical culture. This igno-
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rance and its perpetuation through lack of credible courses and research on 
the subject are almost beyond comprehension. However, it does exist. As 
a result, the new generation is not growing with the right kind of attitude 
toward modernity in the Muslim world. Modernity is identified with the 
West—and then with the depravity of the pop culture in the West. Science 
and technology rarely emerge in the consciousness of ordinary folks at the 
mention of modernity.73 
It should go without saying that this anomaly needs to be corrected 
both in the Western conception of the history of modern science and in the 
historical understanding of the Muslims of their own past. The persistence 
of deliberate misrepresentation in the West and systematic ignorance in 
Muslim societies creates the space in which both sides can focus on the 
negative in each other and engage in mutual demonizing. The West and 
the world of Islam need to realize, at the deepest level possible, that they 
more than any other culture of the world perhaps, are directly responsible 
for the achievements as well as ills of modernity. The contemporary envi-
ronmental crisis, the abuse of and the potential for abuse of new technolo-
gies, and the mindless pursuit of wealth by the corporate world at the cost 
of the poor communities throughout the world are some of the grave ills of 
modernity. Great achievements in areas such as health and education, and 
sociopolitical rights and democracy are some of the positives of the mod-
ern world. Insofar as Islamic culture paved the way for the emergence of 
modern science, technology, and commerce, it must share both the blame 
and credit for their outcomes for humanity. However, if the Muslim world 
and the West do not have a correct historical understanding of each side’s 
role in the emergence of modernity, they’ll forever suffer from a distorted 
view of each other. 
The second point that needs to be made here is that, although science 
and technology are rarely linked today with Islam in any deep historical 
sense by ordinary folks in the Muslim world, they still do not look at them 
with suspicion. In the popular perception in the Muslim world, science and 
religion are not antithetical. People do have a great admiration for modern 
science and technology and believe them to be generally consistent with 
their faith. While there can be an occasional reaction against some scien-
tific ideas, there is no systematic official opposition of any scientific theory 
by the religious establishment. As a whole, therefore, the religious estab-
lishment seems to be far more accepting of scientific ideas in the Muslim 
world than it is in the West.74 This, I believe, is a happy reflection on the 
overall culture of Muslim societies and points toward the psychological 
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space in modern societies for the acceptance of one of the most important 
ingredients of modernity. 
This generally positive attitude of Muslim societies toward science and 
technology relates to my third point mentioned above—that is, the encour-
agement in the Qur’an for the study of nature. This is not the place to go 
into details of the Qur’anic worldview. It suffices to note that the Qur’an 
describes its own verses and the phenomena of nature both as “signs” (ayat) 
of God. Therefore, equivalence is established by the Qur’an in the study of 
its own verses and study of the phenomena of nature. Both are supposed 
to open up one’s heart and mind to the Truth (al-Haq)—that is, God.75 The 
text of the Qur’an and the texture of nature are linked in the Qur’anic meta-
physics through the being of Truth that both embody. Science is only a way 
of studying or grasping that truth as far as humanly possible. 
It is because of this worldview of the Qur’an that science both cannot 
and has never been systematically opposed in Muslim societies. As I men-
tioned above, George Saliba and others have recently established the indis-
pensability of Muslims’ contribution toward the emergence of Renaissance 
science. Hence, the culture of Islam in the Middle Ages was particularly 
conducive for the development of scientific ideas and new technologies, 
and this same environment can be regenerated in Muslim societies with 
proper effort and investment. 
This brings us to my fourth and last point in this section. Muslim soci-
eties today need not take only a naive view of modern technologies. These 
are not value-neutral problem-solving instruments. While there is no ques-
tion that modern technologies play a tremendous role in our lives and ad-
dress a wide range of problems in our lives, they do have their own meta-
physical underpinnings and ethical implications. This is obvious from the 
ethical problems that have arisen for all societies in areas like information 
and medicine. The Internet and genetic engineering are revolutionizing our 
control over health, life, medicine, surgery, distance, and the flow of infor-
mation. This has brought us face to face with huge moral issues in bioethics 
cyber crime, including the exposure of children to pornographic materials 
on the Internet or the possibility of their sexual exploitation by predators 
in cyberspace. These problems know no boundaries and are being faced by 
all societies in today’s global village. Like other societies Muslims are also 
trying their best to deal with these issues as best as they can in the light 
of their religious, spiritual, and ethical values. There is an urgent need, 
however, for an institutionalization of this process of dealing with these 
problems resulting from the use of modern technologies. Even as Muslims 
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 28:132
modernize by imbibing new technologies, such institutionalization at the 
state level, along with the necessary legislation, can help Muslim societies 
manage these issues effectively and in accordance with their values and 
religious understanding.
The Overall Proposal for Modernization 
The points that emerge from the preceding sections are:
1. In our global village today, the reality appears to be managed mostly by 
the Western media networks representing the hegemonic and neocolonial 
agenda of Western powers. Muslim and other developing societies have 
little power to match this Western-managed reality with their own alter-
natives. As a result, their members are either overwhelmed and acqui-
esce or feel threatened and adopt a rejectionist attitude toward modernity 
or postmodernity, which they identify with the Western representation of 
reality through the media and pop culture.
2. The global rise in disparity between the rich and poor has turned into 
a real crisis. In the present conditions of the world, where half of the 
world population lives on less than a two-dollar-a-day subsidy that a cow 
receives in Europe, how can one expect the huge populations of the de-
veloping Muslim world to believe that the West is playing fair with them 
in the current economic order. Western hegemony and domination has 
very concrete day-to-day consequences for the “wretched of the earth” 
in today’s world. 
3. Western powers have offered a systematic double-talk as far as mod-
ernization and democratization of the developing Muslim (and other) 
societies are concerned. Throughout the twentieth century, they have de-
railed democratization and the modernization processes in the Muslim 
societies time and again in order to pursue their own governing agenda 
of the moment. Hence, there is a trust deficit between Muslim societies 
and the West when it comes to believing the West’s claims of working for 
modernization and democratization of these societies. An ethical shift in 
the Western attitude toward Muslim societies is a precondition for any 
process for the modernization of Muslim societies to go forward.
4. Within the Islamic tradition, we do have a universal ethics available that 
can be made a foundation of sociopolitical reorganization of Muslim so-
cieties on modern lines with a guarantee to all citizens of equal rights 
and liberties. This would mean the end of military dictatorships or mon-
archies or other forms of despotism in the Muslim world. The West and 
Muslim societies need to stand for such changes firmly on the basis of 
universal ethical principles. 
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5. There is a deep historical link between modern science and technol-
ogy and Islamic civilization, which provided the foundations for their 
emergence through Muslim Spain and Sicily. Also, the overall cultural 
attitude of Muslim societies toward science is quite accepting, and the 
Qur’anic worldview also encourages scientific study of nature. 
6. Both the West and Muslim societies suffer from a deep misconception or 
ignorance, or both, about the historical link between Islam and moder-
nity, especially its science component. This has resulted generally in a 
narrow view of the capacity of Muslim societies to achieve and practice 
modern science and technology—as well as sometimes the possibility of 
modern institutions on both sides for creating space for mutual demon-
izing. If this situation is corrected, a better outlook and mutual apprecia-
tion of a common heritage can open new avenues for modernization. 
7. An ongoing critical evaluation of the metaphysical and ethical implica-
tions and consequences of modern technologies is a basic need of all in the 
global village, including Muslim societies. Each culture needs to address 
this issue from its own angle so that a diversity of ways for dealing with 
technologies is available to humanity. 
In this kind of a complex situation, one is a little puzzled by the calls to 
modernity or postmodernity coming from both the West and the Muslim 
world itself, though for different reasons. In case of the West, there is very 
little credible evidence that modernity in the Muslim world is its real agen-
da. In case of the voices of modernity within the Muslim world, what is 
puzzling is the focus of all the major thinkers. They almost all focus on 
the issue of the modernization of the religious form of knowledge and its 
interpretation.76 There is very little attention paid to modernization of a so-
ciohistorical form of knowledge based on the universal ethical teachings of 
the Qur’an, or on readopting of scientific form of knowledge at a compre-
hensive and deep cultural level. There has to be a deep change of outlook 
both in the West and in the Muslim societies—a sort of paradigm-shift—in 
order to expand the process of modernization for the Muslim world in a 
directed way. 
Some basic questions that may be asked here, however, are as follows: 
Why should Muslim societies modernize and why should the Western 
powers help them modernize? These are very broad questions and cannot 
be fully answered in the scope of a short article like this one. However, I 
have been working in this article with the assumption that it is in every-
body’s interest to help modernize the developing societies of the world in 
keeping with the universal principles of their traditions. Such pluralistic 
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modernization can ensure greater prosperity for all, and it is as important 
for the survival of human family, as biodiversity is for the survival of our 
biological world. Developed, diverse, and vibrant modern cultures on the 
globe will definitely enhance our overall happiness as well as prosperity 
and growth. The history of humankind does not have a diversity of cultures 
in place for nothing. Despite peoples’ prejudices toward each other over 
the millennia, they have always learnt from each other and have progressed 
not in isolation but through mutual influence.
If this assumption is correct, then it is absolutely reasonable to work 
both in the West and the developing societies (including the Muslim soci-
ety) for the (pluralistic) modernization of the later. Humanity can succeed 
in creating a vibrant and balanced global village only by ensuring both 
development and diversity in it. That is possible only through diverse cul-
tural paths to modernization based on universal ethics and the absorption 
of modern science and technology in all the cultures. On the one hand, 
Islamic societies do have the ethics as well as the historical and cultural 
background for restructuring their sociopolitical institutions—and, on the 
other hand, they have the ability to expand their scientific and technologi-
cal knowledge. However, as I hinted earlier, there seems to be a total ab-
sorption among recent Muslim thinkers with the reinterpretation of reli-
gious forms of knowledge rather than working in a balanced way on the 
ethical and scientific forms as well. Also, the West is not clear in its moral 
commitment to the goals of diversity and the universal development on 
the globe, at least not in practice. This situation on both sides needs to be 
rectified urgently in order to cause a paradigm shift of the response to the 
needs of humanity.
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